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CHAPTER 11 
 
Budget Reforms in Spain – 
Beyond Budget Stability to Substantive Performance 
 
Xavier Ballart and Eduardo Zapico 
 
Spanish governments started the reform of the budgetary process during the first half of 
the 1980s with the introduction of program budgeting. But internal budgetary practices 
did not change significantly. The budgetary process remains under the control of the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda or MEH) – the 
agency in charge of controlling public expenditure, setting taxes, managing borrowing 
and setting overall economic and fiscal policy. This main central budget actor did not 
pursue a policy of broad managerial reform or change the system to make it more 
managerial or business like, as some other OECD countries did (OECD 2001).  
However, Spain has been a success in terms of budget stability – comprising of the 
imposition of fiscal discipline, the attainment of budget surpluses and the achievement 
of debt reduction. All this has been achieved in a decentralized system of government 
where more than 50 percent of public spending depends on regional and local 
governments. In a rather traditional, pragmatic, incremental and bureaucratic fashion, 
Spanish governments, including both the Socialist and the Popular Parties, 
progressively reduced the deficit until the year 2005, when they achieved the first of a 
series of consecutive surpluses maintained over the past three years (MEH 2008). So, 
budget stability arrived, annual budget outcomes improved, documentation partially 
changed, but Spain did not change the budget decision-making process nor embrace 
with enthusiasm reforms to deliver meaningful information presented together with the 
budget.  
 
From the 1980s Spain’s disaggregated public sector experienced profound 
transformations in public finance – especially in the volume and composition of revenue 
and spending. However, it was external pressure which was critical in forcing Spanish 
governments to make serious efforts to achieve fiscal consolidation after 1994. In 
particular, Spain’s agreement to join the ‘Euro’ and abide by the conditions of the 
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Economic and Monetary union (EMU), empowered governments to impose and 
maintain fiscal discipline. Successive Ministers of Economy and Finance, representing 
Socialist and Popular party governments, were proud to leave public finances in better 
shape than they had found them on reaching power. The European pressure justified a 
policy of top-down control over the budgetary process, but more in the area of budget 
stability and aggregate public spending than in the areas of spending management or the 
re-distribution of resources. In its macro-economic policy, Spain approved tough fiscal 
rules in 2001 and 2006 (see Ley 2001; and Ley 2006a), which can be interpreted as the 
national version of the European Stability and Growth Pact. With regard to the micro-
management of resources, Spain also passed two pieces of legislation with the Budget 
Law of 2003 (Ley 2003) and the Agencies Law of 1996 (Ley 2006b), but their impact on 
public administration has not yet been so profound.  
 
This chapter presents, in the first place, an overview of the Spanish trajectory in 
budgetary reform. It considers initiatives taken in the area of fiscal discipline and 
stability, and reports changes to budget processes and resource management, 
particularly with the gradual adoption of a performance budget framework. Second, it 
provides an analysis of changes introduced in budget documentation and in the budget 
cycle, including changes in the relations between the MEH and spending ministries. 
Budget reform in sub-central governments has not been considered. Finally, discussion 
turns to an evaluation of the main outcomes of the reforms attempted, including the use 
of an output-outcomes framework and the extent to which a performance-oriented 
perspective is present in Spain’s policy-making. 
 
Spain’s Trajectory of Budgetary Reform  
 
The Spanish trajectory in budgetary reform has been gradual and adaptive since there 
were no big bursts of change or innovation. Spain followed the path of earlier reforms 
in the US and in other advanced European countries with a partial introduction of 
program budgeting in the 1980s. More recently, Spain has adapted to the requirements 
of the European EMU by declaring its intentions to eliminate annual budget deficits. It 
has also begun discussions to adopt a form of output-outcome management as 
advocated by the OECD, the IMF and other international institutions. Hence, Spain is 
no new-comer to budgetary reforms. It has followed a long path of reform from the first 
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attempts to rationalize spending decisions until the recent reforms to ground budgetary 
policy in a wider European framework while governing a decentralized system which is 
all but in name a federal state.   
 
One can distinguish at least four distinct, although somehow overlapping, phases of 
budget reform:  
• a phase of improved planning techniques and technical improvements from 1976 
to 1979;  
• a program budgeting phase from 1984 to 1994;  
• a belief in the zero deficit phase over the period from 1994 to 2006 leading to the 
enactment of budget stability laws; and 
• a recent phase of a return to the performance management philosophy from 
2003 to 2008.  
These four phases are examined in turn. 
 
Improved Planning and Technical Improvements 1976 – 1979 
 
Spain did not introduce any of the initiatives that were taking place during the 1960s in 
the main European countries with regard to the review of public spending (Gunther 
1980). The main concern of the post-Franco regime before the adoption of the 
democratic Constitution in 1978 was with fiscal growth and with the main policy 
instrument being major ‘development plans’. Those plans not only committed 
substantial resources to projects, but also induced the application of methodologies for 
the ex ante assessment of public investment and the cost-benefit analysis of projects, 
particularly in areas of public works and infrastructures.  
 
The introduction of these planning techniques was limited in scope to economic 
projects. It was not applied to wider social programs (Ruiz-Huerta et al. 2007). The 
innovations of this phase can hardly be considered as major budgeting reforms. 
Furthermore, there was almost no correspondence between cost estimates obtained in 
the process of evaluating projects and final executed budget allocations. There was also 
no coherent policy to improve spending management, nor was there the institutional 
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capacity to monitor and manage the budgeting cycle on the basis of better information 
on outputs and effectiveness. 
 
Program Budgeting 1984-1994  
 
The first Socialist government after the democratic transition came to office in 1982 
with the political promise of change. While much of its big spending plans were 
conditioned by the severity of the industrial crisis in Spain, the charismatic President 
Felipe González (1982-96), put great emphasis on reforming public administration and 
making the machinery of government work better. 
 
Fascinated by the US and French experience with program budgeting, the MEH invited 
some spending departments to produce a new budget format based on programs. In 
1984, the Council of Ministers officially required all departments and public 
organizations to present their expenditures according to program classifications. The 
order from the ministry established basic rules on setting objectives and devising 
indicators for every program. Since then expenditure information in the Spanish budget 
has been presented according to three basic criteria: by economic function, by 
organizational allocations and by program structures.  
 
The aspiration of the then government was to add rationality to a budgetary process in 
which decisions were often taken on the basis of incomplete information. Reforms were 
introduced from a results-oriented perspective, intending to link funding decisions with 
results, effectiveness or impact. However, the program reforms did not prove useful in 
budgetary coordination, or in providing a more coherent view of public spending across 
all areas of government. The focus on programs did not improve the motivations or the 
actions of the various spending departments or agencies. The broad definition of 
programs was often criticized (Zapico 1989) and public administrators had trouble in 
setting objectives, finding adequate and relevant indicators and, in general, connecting 
their activities with social impacts or the overall statutory strategic plan of the 
government. As well, for presentational purposes ministries and agencies grouped their 
programs into one multi-year program that included long-term information on the 
activities of public enterprises and other public entities with a functional dependency on 
the ministries. It was hard to see demonstrated performance.  But within this phase we 
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also saw the introduction of intense computerization of budget administration within the 
public sector and of change in auditing techniques to make spending controls less 
obstructive while enabling auditors to look into performance activity beyond the control 
of compliance with legal requirements (MEH1983; and 1985).  
 
The volume of resources managed by the public sector increased considerably during 
the second half of the 1980s through to the beginning of the 1990s until the economic 
crisis of 1993 hit the Spanish state. Previous assumptions about the levels of economic 
growth were overly optimistic and decentralized public administrations, particularly the 
Autonomous Communities, had problems in meeting the increased demands for public 
services in the areas of education, health and public infrastructure.  The inevitable result 
increased deficits and added to the growing burden of public debt at the regional and 
local levels. 
 
Believing in the Zero Deficit and Budget Stability Laws 1994-2006  
 
The reform emphasis on results lost some ground in the mid-1990s because the utility of 
program budgeting was questioned and because political attention now turned toward 
the European EMU integration process. Spain began a period of continuous growth 
from 1994 until 2008 which provided robust increases in revenues. As in the Australian 
and New Zealand cases included in this book, the combination of increased tax receipts 
and expenditure discipline made it possible to produce an almost balanced budget by the 
year 2000 and to achieve annual budgetary surpluses from 2005 to 2007.  
 
The accomplishment of budgetary surpluses encouraged the government to formalize 
balanced budgets through the imposition of budget stability laws. While the Spanish 
budget remains authorized on an annual basis, since 1998 the public sector has been 
expected to work with long-term economic scenarios and multi-year programming as 
the main reference for the preparation of the annual budget. Then in 2001 the Spanish 
parliament passed legislation on budgetary stability. This first law was subsequently 
amended in 2006 after it was considered that the original definition of ‘stability’ was 
excessively rigid.  Moreover, it was also felt that autonomous communities had to 
participate in the discussion of the general budget framework as they are also 
responsible of the final budgetary results of the whole country. 
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The amended stability law of 2006 linked the principle of budget stability to the 
economic cycle. It stipulated the obligation for governments to budget for a surplus 
when economic circumstances were favorable, while allowing the possibility of 
incurring in a deficit during the low phases of the economic cycle with the aim of 
achieving an average position of equilibrium (Iglesias 2007). The Council of Ministers, 
on the basis of the reports of the MEH, was responsible for determining budgetary goals 
and the upper and lower stability limits for a three year period. The proposed budget of 
the central government was then presented to the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council 
where the autonomous communities met and deliberated with the central government. 
Once finalized, the proposed budget thereafter needed to be approved by both chambers 
of the parliament.  
 
The stability legislation introduced in 2001 and amended in 2006 includes a few other 
mechanisms that make the system less vulnerable and more coherent with the 
decentralized nature of the Spanish state. Most noticeably:  
 
1. There is a combined limit of a 1 percent deficit of GDP for the three levels of 
jurisdiction with the following maximum relative composition: not more than 
0.20 percent for the central government; 0.75 percent for the autonomous 
communities; and 0.05 percent for the local entities.  
 
2. There is a possibility of an additional deficit to spend on investments that may 
help to increase the productivity of the system during the low phase of the 
economic cycle. This ‘investment deficit’ also has an upper limit of 0.5 percent 
of GDP for all three administrations made up of 0.20 percent for the central 
government; 0.25 percent for the autonomous communities; and 0.05 percent for 
local governments. Together with the latitude for the general deficit, this brings 
the total deficit to a maximum of 1.5 percent of GDP which is still only half of 
the limit established by European EMU rules. 
 
3. The budget has to include the information necessary to calculate the deficit or 
surplus according to the European system of national and regional accounts.  
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4. In order to avoid deviations during budget execution, the government has to 
include in the annual budget a 2 percent contingency fund or reserve which may 
only be spent on emergency needs such as catastrophes or extraordinary events 
that could not have been forecast when the budget was approved. 
  
5. The stability law does not permit the government to use the surplus from the 
Social Security funds to compensate the deficit of the state. Moreover, each 
regional or local government is also treated as an independent entity and it is not 
possible to compensate individual deficits among themselves.   
 
6. The central government can issue warnings to other administrations if there is a 
serious risk of them not complying with the overall stability objectives.    
 
One of the main questions to be asked is to what extent those laws were necessary since 
the government had already achieved historic successes in the management of public 
finance without them. The answer to that question may be that, in the first place, the 
Spanish government accepted from the very beginning of the negotiations of the various 
European fiscal treaties that stringent rules on fiscal discipline were absolutely 
necessary to avoid falling into deficit and debt. Second, President José M. Aznar (1996-
2004) and his Popular Party announced they intended to be ‘the first in the class’ of 
Europe in fiscal policy and set ‘the zero deficit’ as one of their main goals. This 
objective was later made more flexible but not abandoned by the Socialists who 
returned to government in 2004, since they also wanted Spain to be perceived as a 
‘good European’.  In the third place, both the Popular and Socialist governments 
understood that establishing fiscal rules in statutory law approved by the parliament was 
the best way to impose budget discipline across the system and avoid the tendency of 
present or future political authorities resorting to uncontrolled public spending. 
 
The stability reforms were the eventual outcome of a long process of progressive 
consolidation occurring over more than a decade in the context of sustained economic 
growth. Given the onset of the financial crisis that arose in 2008, the efficacy of such 
laws is yet to be tested during turbulent times. Optimists claim they are here to stay 
given there is widespread political consensus on the main goals. Pessimists will insist 
governments will respond expediently and cannot maintain budgetary stringency against 
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external shocks. Certainly, the stability laws have made budgetary negotiations easier 
for the MEH (Iglesias and Morano 2008). The imposition of caps on spending 
departments allowed the MEH to contain the initial budgetary demands of ministries 
and agencies. Moreover, the central government was able to impose European stability 
and accounting rules on autonomous communities and make regional and local 
administrations comply with fiscal rules in the general context of Spanish public 
finances. 
 
A Return to Performance Management 2003-2008 
 
Two initiatives in 2003 and 2006 indicate a certain philosophical return to performance 
management that had been inaugurated in the 1980s with program budgeting. Steps 
were taken to try to overcome the earlier informational shortcomings of the initial trial 
with program structures. For instance, the General Budget Law was reformed in 2003 to 
emphasize budgeting by objectives and output-outcome measures and including new 
rules and principles for micro-management (MEH 2003; and 2006; Espadas 2005). 
After this reform, it was expected that a relatively sophisticated system would be 
developed on the basis of (i) setting objectives for multi-year programs; (ii) a reliance 
on results-oriented management; (iii) a close alignment between objectives and 
expenditures; (iv) improved performance reporting and the preparation of management 
reports with detailed information on expenditures; and (v) a broad evaluation of results 
and outcomes. The same reform introduced an evaluation procedure for all public 
policies. The MEH initially played a catalytic role in the coordination of the evaluation 
effort of program spending, although a new specialist agency was to be created with this 
specific mission.  
 
The second initiative in 2006 opened the way for greater agencification with the passing 
of the State Agencies Law. There were already various types of entities with different 
degrees of managerial autonomy, some of them with the term ‘agency’ in their name. 
But from this time, the State Agencies Law opened up the possibility of creating up to 
eleven agencies with the idea of granting more managerial autonomy in exchange for 
control with four year contracts, accountability by results, external auditing and the 
responsibility of directors for the results achieved. The first agency created in 2007 was 
the State Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies and the Quality of Public 
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Services under the authority of the Minister of Public Administrations (CECAEE 2004). 
Between 2007 and 2008, six other units of the central administration were transformed 
into agencies in the areas of official government publishing, research, international 
cooperation and development, meteorology, air traffic control and security, and anti-
doping in sport.  
 
From a budgetary perspective, agencies now have greater flexibility since managers 
negotiate directly with the MEH over their general funding levels and have full 
discretion to use the resources except in the area of personnel. Agencies will be able to 
sell a relevant share of their services or encourage sponsors to assist fund their 
activities.  Agencies are able to change the management culture of the organization to 
develop a deeper sense of responsibility among public managers for the resources they 
use and the results they achieve. The MEH has to date been nervous about the 
establishment of agencies because of uncertainties on the revenue side and the loss of 
control over spending. According to various interviews made at the MEH, budget 
officials believe the development of agencies should be reserved only for those areas 
where, by the nature of the services provided, there is a greater chance of improving the 
quality of management and of services for citizens. 
 
Budgetary Documentation Reflects the Reform Interests of Government   
 
The structure and format of the budget papers have not changed much since the mid 
1980s, but there have been considerable changes in the way information is presented. 
Some changes sought to adapt the Spanish national accounts to European public 
standards and norms. Other changes attempted to offer greater transparency to the 
public making the budget more readable and accessible. Each year various versions of 
the budget are posted in the MEH website offering varying degrees of detail. However, 
the annual budget continues to be organized on the basis of three traditional 
classifications. Both the government and the parliament discuss the budget on the basis 
of the organizational allocations and the economic classification of revenues and 
expenditures. The budget also presents information on the basis of expenditure ‘areas’, 
‘policies’ and ‘programs’ which still are very much determined by the organizational 
structure of the government.  
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For example, in the case of the Ministry of External Affairs, the programs identified are 
‘General Administration’ (sic!), ‘Diplomatic Action’, ‘Cooperation for Development’, 
and the ‘Promotion of Spanish Culture Abroad’ which correspond with the main 
operational divisions of the ministry. Two budget documentation series – one with more 
detail, the other for presentation to the parliament – provide a narrative explanation of 
the policies of the ministry and each of the main divisions, including some data on 
expenditure effort but little information on past performance. In the case of the program 
‘Cooperation for Development’ the narrative section of the 2008 Budget emphasizes the 
goal of progressing towards spending 0.7 percent of GDP on external aid but does not 
give details on activities or outcomes of the development division in the past. To find 
such information we need to look elsewhere in the budget documentation where 
ministries are presented according to their basic action plans. In other cases, like in 
Public Works or Transportation, the budget provides a good picture of activity and 
output since it includes all the financial information on investment plans or 
transportation subsidies – with detailed statements for each project or line of action – 
but again there is little information on the existing policy rationale or its intended 
effects which are seen as the responsibility of the ministry.  
 
Budget documentation also reports the government’s fiscal and economic policy 
intentions. It is in this area that the most significant changes in documentation took 
place given the external and internal pressure to make European governments 
accountable for their fiscal and economic policies. The 2006 stability law reform 
regulated with detail the economic reports that the state, regional and local governments 
have to produce with regard to budget and economic cycles. The main responsibility for 
these reports lies with the MEH, which sets the overall budget objectives on the basis of 
the economic performance of the country. The report of the MEH has to take into 
account the diagnostics of the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
Central Bank of Spain, and the National Institute of Statistics. The legislation also 
stipulated the range of economic and social variables and the kinds of analysis that these 
reports have to include. 
 
The autonomous communities and local governments also participate in the deliberative 
processes involved in setting budgetary objectives for the cycle. They produce reports 
to, and for consideration by, the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council and the Local 
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Administration Council – where these sub-national governments meet with the central 
government to seek approval for their financial strategies. Such reports are mandatory 
and they are passed on to the national parliament with the rest of the government 
documentation.  
 
Spending ministries are also required to produce budgetary documentation. They are 
supposed to group the programs delivered by their operational divisions, including those 
performed by agencies, corporations or public enterprises with a functional dependency 
on the ministry. The multi-year action program of each ministry is the basic document 
where the main priorities, policies and programs in each area are presented. 
 
A different kind of new documentation has also been introduced by the internal auditing 
unit within the MEH. The General Controller of Central Government (IGAE) has been 
active in producing documents that were thought to facilitate the task of managers with 
regard to the follow up of programs, their objectives and performance. This is one of the 
instances where the MEH has assumed the role of an agent of change in the area of 
management beyond the organization frontiers of the ministry. 
 
  
The Budget Process – Institutional Players and the Development of a Performance 
Perspective  
 
Each year the budget preparation processes starts in January when the MEH prepares a 
three year budget outline and draft expenditure ceilings for the following year, and 
submits these to the Council of Ministers. The MEH then draws up the ‘Multi-year 
Budgetary Scenario’ in accordance with the various budget laws of 2001, 2003 and 
2006. Then the Directorate General of Budget (DGP) in collaboration with the budget 
offices of spending ministries and agencies prepares long-term projections within the 
scenario for each ministry and submits them to the DGP. The DGP adds revenue 
projections and sends them to the MEH which then presents the full scenario to the 
Council of Ministers. The MEH then prepares the draft budget along with its spending 
recommendations for the Council of Ministers according to the ‘budget stability 
objectives’ for both the national and regional governments.  
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The preliminary draft budget is discussed and approved by the Council of Ministers in 
September, including a multi-year macro-economic framework contained in the 
Stability Program drawn up in accordance with the EU Stability and Growth Pact.  The 
draft budget is then submitted to the lower chamber of the parliament (Congreso de los 
Diputados) by the 1st October.  Parliament scrutinizes and discusses the draft budget in 
October and later reviews the projected budget scenarios and approves the aggregate 
expenditure ceiling during the first quarter of the next year. However, neither the 
Congress nor Senate discuss program performance.  
 
Budget execution is a highly regulated process with a particular concern on legal 
compliance. The functions of auditing and control are vested in two institutions, 
namely: internal audit is performed by the General Audit Office (Intervención General 
de la Administración del Estado – IGAE) while external audits are undertaken by the 
Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Cuentas).  
 
There are four main groups of institutional players that are influential in budget 
deliberations and in the budget preparation process.  
 
First, the Revenue Commission, chaired by the Secretary of State for Finance and 
Budget, is responsible for coordinating the preparation of the revenue forecasts. Second, 
the Spending Policy Commission is chaired by the Minister of Economy and Finance 
with the assistance of the Secretary of State for Finance and Budget and with the 
participation of spending ministers or, by delegation, other top officials representing 
spending ministries and agencies. The role of this commission is to reach agreement on 
an initial allocation of budgetary resources consistent with government priorities and its 
aggregate fiscal policy. The commission sets ceilings within which each spending 
ministry and agency prepares their budget proposals. 
 
 Third, the Ministerial Budget Commissions are composed of representatives from the 
relevant units in each department, chaired by its deputy secretary. The task of these 
commissions is to make proposals for the preliminary draft budget, formulate priority 
criteria, review existing programs and monitor their execution. And, fourth, the Program 
Analysis Commissions exist with at least one in each department. These are chaired by 
the Secretary of State for Finance and Budget, and their functions include the analysis 
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of the adequacy and validity of spending programs and whether they are consistent with 
priorities defined by the Spending Policy Commission. 
 
Insufficient Consideration of Performance Information 
 
One of the key forces behind the Spanish budgetary reform process was the macro-
economic and European pressure to restrict public spending and comply with economic 
stability objectives. Such demands were not only meant to control aggregate spending, 
but also to improve the quality of spending (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). However, the 
twin dimensions of budget stability and performance budgeting have not been addressed 
in a coherent and complementary manner in the Spanish case. 
 
The potential synergy between these dimensions was well captured in the four basic 
principles articulated in the reforms, namely: budgetary stability; multi-year projections; 
transparency; and efficiency in the allocation and use of public funds. The reformed 
budget law incorporated these principles in 2003.  As observed by one commentator:  
 
the substance of the new law shows a keen interest in establishing an appropriate 
normative framework, making it possible to apply efficiency approaches into 
budgeting and to develop a management by results culture in respect to 
expenditure (Sánchez Revenga 2005). 
 
This statutory reform required multi-year programming and the definition of objectives 
on a regular basis. It attempted to establish a systematic link between budget allocations 
and main objectives for spending ministries and agencies through the adoption of 
management by objectives, performance monitoring and policy evaluation. So, in theory 
and according to the law, public managers are required to be effective in attaining their 
objectives and to focus on results in the planning and implementation of their action 
programs.  For each initiative, spending management units are required to specify a 
relevant set of objectives appropriate to their organization. These objectives must be 
included in their annual multiyear program. 
 
Beyond that the management and control systems of public spending must be oriented 
towards results as well as financial compliance. Operational spending units are required 
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to prepare an annual report on the achievement of their objectives, which is to be 
included in their annual reports and in the multi-year programming of the ministry. 
Then, in theory, the MEH, in collaboration with spending ministries and agencies, leads 
and coordinates the evaluation of budget programs with the purpose of ensuring that 
spending policies achieve their strategic and socio-economic objectives. 
 
However, the reality is somewhat different.  The capacity of the Program Analysis 
Commissions to facilitate performance information sharing and debate on results in the 
budget process remains quite limited. The Program Analysis Commissions were 
supposed to play the role of analyzing the adequacy and validity of spending programs 
in relation to their objectives; allocating resources within the budget ceilings for each 
ministry or agency; and ensuring that proposed allocations are consistent with priorities 
set at the political level. It was also intended that these commissions reviewed and took 
into consideration program results in the preceding year. 
 
But they have not been very successful in playing these roles due to both technical and 
political factors. For instance, there are shortcomings in the instructions received from 
the Spending Policy Commissions. Often, these instructions are neither concrete nor 
effectively communicated. There is a tendency to avoid or hide conflict rather than deal 
with it in a transparent manner. It appears that communications are difficult and 
collaboration is low between spending ministries and the Directorate General of Budget. 
There is sometimes a major imbalance between the volume of information requested by 
the DGP and that received from the spending management units. This information also 
often arrives at the very last minute. The capacity to process and analyze this 
information is profoundly limited. Most of the information is financial in nature and the 
amount of relevant performance information remains sparse. Often, spending units do 
not have sufficiently accurate information about the budget implications of departmental 
plans, reform programs, or legislative proposals, complicating oversight over the 
adaptation of annual plans to the medium-term budget scenarios.  
 
Furthermore, there is insufficient use made of the analytical capacities of the various 
institutional players and usually weak preparation of the starting positions for 
negotiation on both sides. Analysis lacks sufficient depth, with most budget 
commitments being considered unavoidable (e.g. personnel costs). The scope for 
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discretionary decision-making for budget corrections is perceived as narrow. While this 
may be valid in the short term, it is not necessarily the case over a medium or longer 
term horizon.  Finally, there is limited scope for serious debate in the Program Analysis 
Commissions. Discussions are mainly focused on the projections of spending line items 
according to expected variations in inflation, or to new legislation or government 
initiatives. There is not enough time for debate or systematic analysis of programs. 
Debates are incremental and, frequently, focused on the maximum percentage increases 
authorized for budget chapters. There is scarcely any systematic debate about spending 
policies or ministerial priorities and past or expected performance. There is also no 
debate on interdepartmental programs. So far, budget scenarios have been mainly 
considered a formal exercise adjusted to the annual budget instead of the other way 
around.  Annual budgeting should be an extension of the budget scenarios. As one of 
the authors of this chapter has written before:  
 
The efficient allocation of resources in the framework of budgetary scenarios 
prepared with transparency – better knowledge on sector programs and 
information on performance – and with the active participation of spending 
managers, would be much more effective and relevant than the current annual 
program budget negotiations which focus on chapters or line items expenditures 
(Zapico 2005). 
 
But it would be wrong to consider that the Program Analysis Commissions do not add 
value to the budget process. The symbolic and relational role played by the 
Commissions in the process of preparing the budget has again been underlined by 
(Zapico 2005), who found:  
 
They significantly facilitate direct relationships among senior officials and shape 
expectations and standards of behavior or decision-making style facilitating 
progress towards reaching budget agreements. The commissions make it possible 
for technical specialists to obtain direct information on agreements or 
disagreements at the policy levels. 
 
Some general suggestions for improving the functioning of the Program Analysis 
Commissions involve incorporating a more strategic and selective approach into the 
 17
budget negotiations; introducing a multi-year perspective in the debates; and taking into 
account information sensitive to the institutional and political context. More specific 
recommendations to improve the work of the DGP and the Program Analysis 
Commissions would include the following suggestions. First, there should be some 
modification of the role and competencies of the DGP in relation to the Program 
Analysis Commissions. When preparing for program analysis meetings, the DGP 
should reorient its efforts and resources toward the analysis of selective strategic 
spending.  Debates at the commissions should focus on the long term effects and 
impacts of spending.  Second, the application of management by objectives and of 
adequate criteria in resource allocation should be encouraged. One of the main concerns 
of Program Analysis Commissions should be to ensure the consistency of budget 
programs with sector plans of spending ministries and government priorities. Other 
types of analysis (e.g. assessment of the socio-economic and environmental impact of 
policies or cost-effective analysis) could be prepared in collaboration with external 
experts. 
 
Third, the Program Analysis Commissions require new aims and a revision of their 
composition and size. Four types of meetings could be considered: (i) preparatory 
meetings with experts from the budget offices and the audit office in spending 
ministries; (ii) interface meeting between the DGP and spending ministry officials; (iii) 
follow up and compliance meetings; and (iv) final meetings, at the top level, after which 
no changes should be accepted unless accompanied by offsetting proposals from the 
same department. The composition and size of the commissions should be adjusted 
depending on the type of meetings in order to ensure their flexible and efficient 
functioning.  Fourth, the commissions need to improve their decision-making capacities. 
To achieve such improvement the DGP should adopt a more proactive attitude during 
the preparation of new sector plans and programs in spending ministries. Officials of the 
DGP should be searching for information in the early stages on the potential budget 
impact of the main policy initiatives. This would allow them to anticipate possible risks 
of excessive spending, and to ensure sound programming (i.e., relating resources to 
objectives and actions; choosing relevant indicators; making subsequent monitoring and 
evaluation feasible). 
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Fifth, better incentives should be introduced for coordination and collaboration between 
the DGP, budget offices, and management operational services. Reports from the 
OECD (such as OECD 2001), the United Kingdom (UK Cabinet Office 1999) and the 
Chilean government (Chilean National Budget Office 2003) present various examples 
of policy options that would enhance collaboration among budget and management 
officials. Some examples include: 
 
a) sharing the ‘profits’ from performance budgeting between the Ministry of 
Economy and the spending ministries and agencies; rewarding savings resulting 
from cutbacks or from efficiency gains; or granting flexibility to allocate a portion 
of the profits in accordance with predetermined criteria; 
 
b) creating a ‘reserve fund’ for innovation and productivity, to be distributed on a 
competitive basis;  
 
c) signing budget agreements specifying the information required on resources, 
objectives, and activities while allowing more flexible spending management 
controls;  
 
d) using indicators of outcomes or impacts that require the cooperation of several 
services;  
 
e) focusing evaluation efforts on recognizing and promoting desirable management 
styles more than on the identification of spending misbehaviour or noncompliance;  
 
f) making the provision of funds contingent on meeting the information 
requirements.  
 
The Main Outcomes of Budget Reform and Some Final Considerations  
 
After several decades of budget reform in Spain, it is generally accepted that budgetary 
policy has been effective in introducing budget stability and fiscal discipline. The 
Spanish deficit of 0.98 percent of GDP in the year 2000 translated into a surplus of 1.3 
percent in 2007 while public debt was reduced from the 50.9 percent of GDP in 2000 to 
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just 34.3 percent in 2007.  In terms of budget management, new budget documentation 
offers an improved structure and more transparency to parliament and the public in 
general, while the budget process is now better structured involving more orderly 
interaction between budget officials and spending managers in the Program Analysis 
Commissions. 
 
There have also been significant efforts to introduce a performance management 
perspective in the preparation and execution of budgets. However, the budget process in 
Spain still needs further improvements to consolidate an effective and sound 
performance budgeting system. Several weaknesses have been identified, namely: the 
lack of quality of the non-financial information produced; that budget programs follow 
organizational structures; that there is no time in the budget cycle for analysis and 
deliberation; a neglect of incentives to increase effectiveness and efficiency; and a lack 
of capacity within the DGP to process information.  
 
Additional efforts are gradually being made to maintain budget discipline and further 
develop intended financial management reforms focusing on performance monitoring 
and program evaluation, both at the MEH and in spending ministries and agencies. 
However, the combination of stringent discipline norms together with formal requests 
for more performance-based budgeting, have proved insufficient in the past. Going 
forward, attention should now be paid to the cultural values and administrative behavior 
of main budget actors, which seem to limit the effectiveness of further reform. 
 
One of the main obstacles to advancing the performance budgeting agenda was that 
budget authorities were not clear about the distribution of roles and responsibilities 
between the MEH and spending entities in the framework of performance budgeting. 
The main focus of the MEH was on expenditure control and fiscal discipline while 
simultaneously they expected ministries to develop the tasks of devising and revising 
outputs and outcomes.  
 
To achieve a substantial qualitative improvement in performance budgeting there are 
several contextual conditions and socio-organizational factors to be considered. These 
are listed below.  
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First, a high degree of credible, well-built and sustained political support is necessary. 
One explanation for the limited success of performance budgeting to date is the 
inadequacy or lack of continuity of political support. There was once a strong 
commitment and political will in the MEH to start the implementation of program 
budgeting. However, this interest has not been maintained over time. The political 
power of the Finance Minister might not be sufficient to get an active collaboration 
from spending ministries and agencies without the explicit support of the President of 
the government. 
 
Second, budgeting cannot be assumed to be a neutral-technical exercise providing 
economic and financial predictions, or a mere legislative process. Some of the problems 
identified in this chapter relate to the attempts to impose reform processes from the 
centre on the basis of an ideal technical solution. A non-participatory approach to 
budget reform might result merely in formal compliance, some ‘creative budgeting’ or 
even the rejection of performance initiatives. Conflicts and negotiations in the process 
should not be perceived as dysfunctional – to be avoided at all costs or solved by 
‘objective or neutral’ analysis followed by ‘automatic’ or uncontestable decisions.  
Uncertainty, conflict and interdependence are part of the reality of the budget process. 
Specifying objectives, measuring performance, analyzing options and structuring the 
budget by programs may facilitate stability and predictability in budgeting, but will not 
eliminate the need for budget negotiation and conflict management. 
 
Third, respect for the norms and legal traditions of a nation should be complemented 
with the development of a ‘management-by-results’ culture. There is an emerging 
sentiment that the legal perspective towards public budgeting is incompatible with a 
management approach, or that trade-offs between the two are necessary. On the 
contrary, we would argue it is necessary to complement the concerns about the legality 
of spending with a new emphasis on performance. 
 
Fourth, formal rules and norms are insufficient in themselves to achieve systemic 
change.  There is often a normative assumption that once new rules are announced they 
will be accepted and adopted. Legal and hierarchical traditions are deeply rooted in the 
Spanish system.  New laws are proposed in the belief that success will be achieved once 
the ‘perfect’ norm is established and strictly applied. Although the importance of formal 
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procedures should not be underestimated, they are not sufficient by themselves to 
ensure the successful development of performance budgeting. It is necessary to apply 
the same model – ‘management-by-results’ – to the implementation of new reforms. 
The efforts of the MEH have been based primarily on introducing new legislation and 
guidelines for implementing changes in budgeting, auditing and evaluation. The 
application of the ‘management-by-results’ perspective to the process of budget reform 
has not been systematically considered. The evaluation of the reforms has been 
neglected. A continuous effort is required for assessing the impact of the reforms to date 
and for searching for reform improvements.  
 
Fifth, a capacity to learn about ‘spending management’ must be developed. 
Performance budgeting represents an ideal budget model which supposedly facilitates 
improvements in public management. It is often perceived as ‘the’ solution for the 
public sector as a whole. The applicability of this model to different contexts or types of 
public organizations has not been questioned in the Spanish context. Abstract models 
are often regarded as state of the art by central players. But while spending managers 
will adapt their information systems and financial procedures to the requirements of the 
MEH, they do not necessarily regard them as genuinely valuable for their own 
management interests. This may explain the difficulties identified when it comes to 
learning how to introduce the model or how to adapt it to a specific organizational 
context. So, contingencies affecting its implementation need to be considered. This will 
entail consideration of the viability or validity of the reform instrument; where it is 
appropriate or inappropriate; whether there is sufficient capacity to managing the 
reform; or whether prevailing administrative norms (such as a hierarchical or legalistic 
culture) may affect the effective completion of the reform. 
 
In short, the development of performance budgeting and ‘management-by-results’ will 
substantially benefit from sustained political support; from an enhanced learning 
capacity; and from the introduction of the right incentives (e.g., accountability for 
results). Crosscutting these three success factors, important efforts should be made to 
increase the interaction and cooperation between the various reform stakeholders so as 
to overcome the risk that adverse behavior will undermine efforts to adapt budget 
reforms to specific contexts or block collective efforts to move forward with 
performance budgeting within the Spanish public sector. We await the next steps.  
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